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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                            
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
           
         In this case we must decide whether the Township of 
Brick's refusal to grant a variance to Hovsons, Inc. ("Hovsons") 
to build a nursing home in the Township's R-R-2 zone, an area the 
district court found to be predominantly residential, violates 
the mandate of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 
42 U.S.C.  3601 et seq., that all municipalities provide 
"reasonable accommodations" to handicapped persons.  Id.  
3604(f)(3)(B).  The district court rejected Hovsons' FHAA claims 
and denied its request for declaratory and injunctive relief.   
         We conclude that the accommodation Hovsons has put 
forward would not impose an undue financial or administrative 
burden upon Brick Township.  Nor would building a nursing home in 
the R-R-2 zone fundamentally undermine the Township's zoning 
scheme.  We therefore hold that the finding of the district court 
that the Township complied with the FHAA's "reasonable 
accommodations" provision cannot stand.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the August 16, 1995 order of the district court and 
remand with instructions to enjoin the Township of Brick from 
interfering with Hovsons' plans to construct the nursing home 
facility that the State of New Jersey authorized it to build in 
Brick Township.   
  
                                I. 
                                A. 
         Hovsons is a developer of nursing homes and other forms 
of senior citizen housing, such as adult retirement communities.  
Hovcare of Brick, Inc., a corporation affiliated with Hovsons, 
owns a 32.73-acre parcel of land on the Brick Township-Lakewood 
Township border in New Jersey.  Hovsons has proposed to build a 
nursing home facility on that parcel.  Approximately twenty-two 
(21.96) of the acres are located in Brick Township;  the 
remaining (10.77) acres are in Lakewood Township.  Hovsons' 
developmental plan calls for site construction only on the Brick 
Township portion of the property.  Brick Township has steadfastly 
opposed the construction of such a development within the R-R-2 
zone.  
         The nursing home facility Hovsons has envisioned is 
intended for persons who will require some form of nursing care 
for the rest of their lives.  Referred to as "Holiday Village," 
it would have the capacity to house 210 residents.  The density, 
architecture and design features of the proposed development are 
comparable to that of the surrounding planned retirement 
communities in Brick Township.  The structure and its associated 
parking and access facilities would cover six to seven acres.  
The remaining land area would consist of open spaces, landscaped 
areas and preserved tree buffers. 
         Under New Jersey law, nursing homes may not be built 
unless the need for a home within the applicable health service 
area is established through a certificate of need process.  SeeN.J. Stat. 
Ann.  26:2H-7-:2H-8.  On December 2, 1989, the New 
Jersey Department of Health approved Hovsons' application for a 
certificate of need which authorized construction of a 150-bed 
nursing home in Brick Township.  Hovsons' certificate was amended 
on August 12, 1991 to increase the authorized number of beds from 
150 to 210. 
         In its August 12, 1991, approval letter to Hovsons 
authorizing this sixty-bed increase, the New Jersey Department of 
Health cited the acute need for nursing home facilities in Brick 
Township.  New Jersey Commissioner of Health Frances J. Dunston 
declared that building another nursing home in Brick Township 
would "help to maintain balance in the distribution of long-term 
care beds throughout Ocean County, thereby promoting geographical 
access to care for area residents.  Brick Township has 
approximately 6.7 long-term care beds per 1,000 population, 
compared to the County average of 12 beds per 1,000 population."  
App. at 26. In addition, the State prioritized Hovsons' 
application on account of its agreement to have Medicaid-eligible 
patients comprise no less than fifty-five percent of its patient 
population. 
         Brick Township is divided into a total of twenty-three 
zoning districts comprised of fifteen residential zones, seven 
business/office zones and one hospital support zone.  Nursing 
homes are excluded from all fifteen residential zones.  Hovsons 
has proposed to construct Holiday Village in Brick Township's R- 
R-2 or "Rural Residential-Adult Community Zone."  Id. at 242.  
The district court found that the R-R-2 zone is "primarily, 
although not exclusively, for residential use," and that this 
region was zoned by community planners with the intention of 
"minimiz[ing] traffic" and bringing about an environment that was 
both "quiet" and "seclu[ded]."  Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of 
Brick, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 1, 5 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 1995).  In 
the R-R-2 zone, Brick Township permits the following land uses as 
of right and without conditions:  (1) customary and conventional 
farming activities;  (2) one-family dwellings;  (3) public 
schools and accredited private schools;  (4) municipal parks, 
playgrounds and other municipally owned facilities; and (5) 
planned residential retirement communities. 
         The Brick Township R-R-2 zone also allows for a number 
of conditional uses, including:  (1) public utilities 
installations;  (2) hospitals;  (3) public and quasi-public 
philanthropic and charitable uses;  (4) quasi-public buildings 
and recreation areas;  (5) golf courses;  (6) single-family 
residential dwellings with a maximum density of 1.5 dwelling 
units per acre;  (7) single-family residential dwellings with 
open space;  and (8) churches, parish houses, convents and 
cemeteries.  The only area in Brick Township where nursing homes 
can be constructed is the hospital support zone.  Other permitted 
uses in the hospital support zone are doctors' offices, clinics, 
emergency treatment facilities, pharmacies, retail establishments 
for the sale of medical and surgical supplies, motels and 
hospitals.  The hospital support zone is commercial in nature.  
No single or multiple-family residences may be built in this area 
without first obtaining a variance.   
         Brick Township's hospital support zone has already been 
developed extensively.  Less than thirty undeveloped acres 
remain.  The remaining vacant land consists of small, 
noncontiguous, separately owned parcels, the largest site being 
8.6 acres.  The record is unclear as to whether any of the 
undeveloped land in the hospital support zone is currently on the 
market or otherwise available for purchase. 
                                B. 
         In 1990, Hovsons applied for a variance to the Brick 
Township Zoning Board of Adjustment ("Zoning Board"), to build a 
nursing home in the R-R-2 zone.  Hovsons' application was debated 
extensively (a total of seventeen public hearings were conducted 
over a two-year period) and was ultimately denied in April of 
1992. 
         Hovsons challenged the denial of the variance by filing 
a lawsuit against the Zoning Board in the New Jersey Superior 
Court, Law Division.  On February 5, 1993, the Law Division 
reversed the denial of Hovsons' application and remanded the 
matter to the Zoning Board for reconsideration.  Approximately 
two months later, the Zoning Board again denied Hovsons' 
application.  Hovsons appealed the second denial to the New 
Jersey Law Division, which issued an order on April 16, 1993, 
directing that the use variance be issued.  On March 30, 1994, 
the New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the Law Division and 
reinstated the Zoning Board's denial.  Hovsons filed a petition 
for certification with the New Jersey Supreme Court, which was 
denied on July 15, 1994.  Hovsons, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment of Brick Township, 645 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1994). 
         On September 6, 1994, Hovsons filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the 
Township of Brick and the Zoning Board.  Hovsons alleged, inter 
alia, that the defendants had violated the FHAA.  Hovsons 
maintained that the Township and its Zoning Board had 
discriminated against handicapped persons by denying its 
application for a variance to construct a nursing home in the R- 
R-2 zone.  Specifically, Hovsons contended that the defendants' 
actions amounted to intentional discrimination and that the Brick 
Township zoning ordinance had a disparate impact upon handicapped 
persons.  Hovsons further asserted that the defendants had 
refused to comply with the FHAA's requirement that they provide 
"reasonable accommodations" to handicapped persons. 
         Hovsons sought both declaratory and injunctive relief 
to prevent the Township of Brick and its Zoning Board from 
interfering with its plans to build a nursing home in the R-R-2 
zone.  The defendants responded to Hovsons' allegations by filing 
motions for summary judgment.  On June 27, 1995, the district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Zoning Board.  The 
district court ruled that the federal claims Hovsons had brought 
against the Zoning Board could have been raised and litigated in 
previous state court proceedings and were therefore barred under 
the entire controversy doctrine.  The district court also 
dismissed Hovsons' intentional discrimination claim against Brick 
Township, finding that its zoning ordinance was facially valid 
and rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.  
Hovsons has not appealed the dismissal of these claims, nor was 
the entire controversy issue raised on appeal. 
         The district court did find, however, that there were 
material factual issues in dispute regarding Hovsons' disparate 
impact and reasonable accommodation claims against the Township 
of Brick.  The district court further held that the nursing home 
Hovsons has proposed to build should be classified as a 
"dwelling" under the FHAA because it would be a home to its 
prospective residents.  Accordingly, the Township's motion for 
summary judgment on these issues was denied and the case was set 
for trial. 
         A one-day bench trial was held on July 12, 1995.  On 
August 16, 1995, the district court issued its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  The court rejected Hovsons' disparate 
impact argument, reasoning that Hovsons had failed to establish 
that handicapped persons were more adversely impacted by the 
zoning ordinance than people without disabilities.  Furthermore, 
the district court held that Brick Township was not in violation 
of the "reasonable accommodations" provision of the FHAA.  The 
district court opined that  3604(f)(3)(B) does not require 
municipalities "to disregard their own zoning requirements in 
order to provide sufficient opportunities and accommodations for 
the disabled."  Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 6.  In so 
holding, the court relied upon the fact that Brick Township 
permitted the construction of nursing homes in another area of 
the Township.  Moreover, the nursing home would, in the district 
court's view, be inconsistent with the residential character of 
the R-R-2 zone and would not adequately "service the immediate 
surrounding community."  Id. at 5.     
         Hovsons now appeals the judgment of the district court 
rejecting its "reasonable accommodations" and disparate impact 
FHAA claims.  The Township of Brick has cross-appealed the 
district court ruling that the proposed nursing home is a 
"dwelling" within the meaning of the FHAA. 
 
                               II. 
         The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
1331 and 42 U.S.C.  3613.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  1291.  We "exercise[] plenary review over questions of 
statutory construction."  United States v. Columbus Country Club, 
915 F.2d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1205, 
111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991).  
         A number of our sister circuits have held "that in 
enacting the anti-discrimination provisions of the FHAA, Congress 
relied on the standard of reasonable accommodation developed 
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 
29 U.S.C.  794."  Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 
334 (2d Cir. 1995).  Accord United States v. California Mobile 
Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416-17 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(same);  Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, Michigan, 
13 F.3d 920, 930 (6th Cir. 1993).  As it is supported by the 
legislative history of the FHAA, we also adopt this view.  SeeH.R. Rep. 
No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2186 & n.66 ("The concept of `reasonable 
accommodation' has a long history in regulations and case law 
dealing with discrimination on the basis of handicap.") (citing 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S. Ct. 
2361 (1979) (Rehabilitation Act case));  see also Bryant Woods 
Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 911 F. Supp. 918, 940 (D. 
Md. 1996) ("In light of the references to Davis in the 
legislative history of the Fair Housing Act, the courts have 
uniformly concluded that the standards for `reasonable 
accommodations' developed under  504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
also apply to  3604(f)(3)(B)."). 
         In Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 
F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1991), a Rehabilitation Act case, we held that 
a district court's determination as to whether a proposed 
accommodation is "reasonable" is a question of fact.  Id. at 
1386.  Therefore, we would ordinarily review the finding of the 
district court that the accommodation Hovsons proffered was 
unreasonable under the "clearly erroneous" standard.  "A finding 
of fact is clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the evidence, 
the court of appeals is `left with a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.'"  Oberti v. Board of Educ. of 
Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 
1993) (citation omitted).  Our review of the factual findings of 
the district court is confined to "whether there is sufficient 
evidence in the record to support those findings."  Cooper v. 
Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 1988). 
         Hovsons argues that the district court applied the 
wrong legal standard when it placed the burden upon the plaintiff 
to establish that its requested modification was reasonable under 
the FHAA.  We exercise plenary review over the question of 
whether the district court applied an incorrect legal standard.  
See Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1511 
n.11 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).  
      
                               III. 
         The Township of Brick contends that this case should 
not be considered under the FHAA because nursing homes are not 
"dwellings" as defined in the Act.  Hovsons maintains that the 
district court erred in finding that Brick Township complied with 
the "reasonable accommodations" provision of the FHAA.  We will 
address these issues in turn. 
                                A. 
         Section 3604 of the FHAA proscribes discrimination "in 
the sale or rental" of "a dwelling."  42 U.S.C.  3604(f)(1).  
The FHAA defines the term "dwelling" as  
         any building, structure, or portion thereof 
         which is occupied as, or designated or 
         intended for occupancy as, a residence by one 
         or more families, and any vacant land which 
         is offered for sale or lease for the 
         construction or location thereon of any such 
         building, structure, or portion thereof. 
 
42 U.S.C.  3602(b) (emphasis added).  We addressed the issue of 
what constitutes a "dwelling" under the FHAA in United States v. 
Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
501 U.S. 1205, 111 S. Ct. 2797 (1991).   
         One of the issues in Columbus Country Club was whether 
bungalows inhabited by club members during the summer months were 
"dwellings" within the meaning of  3602(b).  The Country Club 
argued that they were not.  Focusing upon what Congress intended 
the word "residence" to mean, we rejected this argument.  We 
observed that "[a]lthough the meaning of the term `residence' is 
central to understanding [the definition of dwelling], the Act 
provides no statutory definition of that term."  Id. at 881.  
Applying a plain meaning analysis, the court looked to the 
definition of "residence" in Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, which defines it as "a temporary or permanent 
dwelling place, abode or habitation to which one intends to 
return as distinguished from the place of temporary sojourn or 
transient visit."  Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 881 
(citation omitted).  This led us to hold "that the central 
inquiry is whether the defendant's annual members intend to 
remain in the bungalows for any significant period of time and 
whether they view their bungalows as a place to return to."  Id.  
         We observed that since "annual members may spend up to 
five months in their bungalows," they were "not `mere 
transients.'"  Id.  Furthermore, there was "no indication in the 
statutory language that Congress intended to limit coverage of 
the Act to year-round places of abode . . . ."  Id.  The court 
also noted that if we were to adopt the Country Club's argument, 
this "would create a broad exception to the Act" that, followed 
to its logical conclusion, could be interpreted to allow 
residents in a private development of summer homes to exclude 
members of minority groups from owning, renting or occupying 
summer homes without violating the FHAA, a result that Congress 
could not have intended.  Id.  We therefore held that the summer 
bungalows fell "within the ordinary meaning of `residence' and 
must be considered dwellings for purposes of the Fair Housing 
Act."  Id. 
         The Township of Brick's argument that the proposed 
nursing home is not a "dwelling" under the FHAA is similarly 
without merit.  To the handicapped elderly persons who would 
reside there, Holiday Village would be their home, very often for 
the rest of their lives.  We therefore hold that the proposed 
nursing home is a "dwelling" within the meaning of  3602(b).  
See United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 
220 (D.P.R. 1991) (applying FHAA to case challenging the closure 
of a nursing home).  We therefore will affirm the judgment of the 
district court to the extent it held that the proposed nursing 
home is a "dwelling," as that term is defined by the FHAA.   
                                B. 
                                1. 
         Section 3604(f)(1) of the FHAA provides that it is 
unlawful  
 
         [t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to 
         otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 
         buyer or renter because of a handicap of-- 
 
              (A)  that buyer or renter, 
 
              (B)  a person residing in or intending to reside 
         in that dwelling after it has been sold, rented, or 
         made available;  or  
 
              (C)  any person associated with that buyer or 
         renter. 
 
42 U.S.C.  3604(f)(1).  Section 3604(f)(3)(B) further provides 
that "[f]or the purposes of this subsection, discrimination 
includes . . . a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in 
rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations 
may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use 
and enjoy a dwelling[.]"  Id.  3604(f)(3)(B).   
         Hovsons argues that the district court erred when it 
placed the burden upon the plaintiff to establish that the 
accommodation that it requested was "reasonable" under the FHAA.  
See Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 4.  We agree.  Our 
precedents interpreting  504 of the Rehabilitation Act have held 
that the burden of proving that a proposed accommodation is not 
reasonable rests with the defendant.  See Juvelis v. Snider, 68 
F.3d 648, 653 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1995);  Nathanson v. Medical College 
of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991).  As we have 
already held that courts must look to the body of law developed 
under  504 of the Rehabilitation Act as an interpretative guide 
to the "reasonable accommodations" provision of the FHAA, we 
further hold that the burden should have been placed upon the 
Township of Brick to prove that it was either unable to 
accommodate Hovsons or that the accommodation Hovsons proposed 
was unreasonable.  We now turn to the question of whether there 
is a sufficient foundation in the record to support the factual 
finding of the district court that Brick Township complied with 
the FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" provision.         
                                2. 
         The conclusion of the district court that the Township 
of Brick satisfied the FHAA's mandate that "reasonable 
accommodations" be provided to handicapped persons was clear 
error.  Brick Township does not permit the construction of 
nursing homes in any of its residential areas.  The Township 
nonetheless contends that the authorization for nursing home 
construction within its hospital support zone, an area zoned for 
hospitals and other medical support facilities, suffices to 
satisfy its legal obligation to handicapped persons.  We 
disagree.   
         The reasoning and analysis of the district court 
evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of the intent of Congress 
in enacting the FHAA.  The district court's statement that the 
FHAA "does not ask [municipalities] to disregard their own zoning 
requirements in order to provide sufficient accommodations for 
the disabled" runs counter to the entire thrust of the FHAA.  
Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 6.  The Township of Brick's 
blanket exclusion of nursing homes from its residential areas in 
general, and its refusal to permit the construction of the 
specific facility in question, is precisely the sort of isolation 
of handicapped persons from the mainstream of society that the 
FHAA was enacted to forbid.  Furthermore, there is a dearth of 
evidence in the record to support Brick Township's sweeping claim 
as to the fundamental incompatibility of nursing homes and 
residential areas in general and the R-R-2 zone in particular.   
         A review of the record, case law interpreting the 
meaning of "reasonable accommodations" and the legislative 
history of the FHAA leads us to conclude that the Township of 
Brick failed to satisfy the requirements of  3604(f)(3)(B) as a 
matter of law.  Although the district court applied the incorrect 
legal standard, we need not remand for further proceedings.  
There was a full hearing on the merits in the district court 
during which each side presented expert testimony on the issue of 
the compatibility of a nursing home with the other uses in the R- 
R-2 zone, and the record is critically deficient of evidence that 
would support a ruling in Brick Township's favor.  We therefore 
conclude that it is appropriate to direct entry of judgment in 
favor of Hovsons.  See Rohm and Haas Co. v Adco Chem. Co., 689 
F.2d 424, 433 (3d Cir. 1982) (directing that judgment be entered 
in favor of plaintiff when adverse result in district court was 
premised upon the application of an incorrect legal standard);  
Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. McCabe, 593 F.2d 234, 239 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (remand unnecessary despite application of the 
incorrect legal standard "because the evidence on the record 
compel[led] the result").   
         The FHAA's "reasonable accommodations" provision 
prohibits the enforcement of "zoning ordinances and local housing 
policies in a manner that denies people with disabilities access 
to housing on par with that of those who are not disabled."  
Laurie C. Malkin, Troubles at the Doorstep:  The Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988 and Group Homes for Recovering Substance 
Abusers, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 757, 804 (1995) (hereinafter Fair 
Housing Amendments Act).  Pursuant to  3604(f)(3)(B), the 
Township of Brick has "an affirmative duty" to make reasonable 
accommodations on behalf of handicapped persons.  United States 
v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1416 
(9th Cir. 1994).  See Juvelis, 68 F.3d at 653 (" 504 requires 
some affirmative steps to accommodate handicapped persons.").      
         "The reasonable accommodation inquiry is highly fact- 
specific, requiring a case-by-case determination."  California 
Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d at 1418.  AccordNathanson, 926 
F.2d at 1385.  As in Rehabilitation Act cases, we 
must view the reasonable accommodations requirement "in light of 
two countervailing legislative concerns:  (1) effectuation of the 
statute's objectives of assisting the handicapped;  and (2) the 
need to impose reasonable boundaries in accomplishing this 
purpose."  Americans Disabled For Accessible Pub. Transp. (ADAPT) 
v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1191 (3d Cir. 1989) (in banc).  We 
keep in mind the principle that satisfaction of the FHAA's 
reasonable accommodation requirement "can and often will involve 
some costs."  Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 335 
(2d Cir. 1995).     
         "Courts interpreting the reasonable accommodation 
provision of the Fair Housing Act have ruled that municipalities 
. . . must change, waive, or make exceptions in their zoning 
rules to afford people with disabilities the same opportunity to 
housing as those who are without disabilities."  Horizon House 
Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 
F. Supp. 683, 699-700 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (collecting cases), aff'd, 
995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993) (Table).  To establish that the 
accommodation proffered by Hovsons was not reasonable, the 
Township of Brick was required to prove that it could not have 
granted the variance "without imposing undue financial and 
administrative burdens," Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 
442 U.S. 397, 412, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 2370 (1979), imposing an 
"undue hardship" upon the Township, Nathanson, 926 F.3d at 1383, 
or requiring "a fundamental alteration in the nature of the 
program . . . ."  Davis, 442 U.S. at 410, 99 S. Ct. at 2369.  SeeAlexander 
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300, 105 S. Ct. 712, 719-20 
(1985).  We conclude that the Township of Brick has failed to 
make such a showing. 
         We acknowledge that precisely what the "reasonable 
accommodations" standard requires is not a model of clarity.  
Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1015 (3d Cir. 
1995);  ADAPT, 881 F.2d at 1193 (acknowledging "[t]he difficulty 
in determining precisely the extent of accommodation mandated by 
section 504");  O'Neal v. Alabama Dep't of Pub. Health, 826 F. 
Supp. 1368, 1376 (M.D. Ala. 1993) ("As centuries of jurisprudence 
have taught us, the word `reasonable' is subject to a wide 
variety of interpretations.").  As one court has observed, "[t]he 
FHAA imposes an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate 
handicapped persons.  However, because the precise obligations 
encompassed by this duty are ambiguous, many courts have looked 
to the legislative history of the Act for guidance."  United 
States v. City of Taylor, Michigan, 872 F. Supp. 423, 436 (E.D. 
Mich. 1995) (citation omitted).  We will also look to the 
legislative history of the FHAA to clarify the meaning of its 
"reasonable accommodations" requirement in the present factual 
setting.   
         We have previously emphasized that the enactment of the 
FHAA was "a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end 
the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the 
American mainstream."  Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 333 n.14 
(3d Cir.) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 64 (1995).  The House Report further states that the FHAA "is 
intended to prohibit the application of special requirements 
through land-use regulations . . . that have the effect of 
limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the residence 
of their choice in the community."  H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2185 
(emphasis added).  Moreover, the FHAA was intended to "require 
that changes be made to . . . traditional rules or practices if 
necessary to permit a person with handicaps an equal opportunity 
to use and enjoy a dwelling."  Id. at 2186.     
         In light of these Congressional pronouncements 
regarding the purpose and scope of the FHAA, it was clear error 
for the district court to conclude that Hovsons' request for a 
variance could not be accommodated.  Granting a variance to 
Hovsons would not have saddled the Township of Brick with "undue 
financial and administrative burdens,"  or otherwise resulted in 
the imposition of an "undue hardship."  On the contrary, the 
proprietors of Holiday Village will become taxpaying members of 
the local community.  Furthermore, the district court 
acknowledged the "considerable efforts [Hovsons has made] to work 
with the township in order to make the site feasible . . . ."  
Hovsons, No. 94-4265, slip op. at 5.  Holiday Village intends to 
manage its own affairs with a minimum of local governmental 
involvement.  Hovsons has agreed to have Holiday Village arrange 
for its own garbage collection, street maintenance and snow 
removal.  The nursing home would rely upon the municipal fire, 
police and emergency services, but its use of these services 
would be no different from that of the surrounding retirement 
developments.  The mere fact that the employees and residents of 
Holiday Village will at times require the assistance of the local 
police and other emergency services does not rise to the level of 
imposing a cognizable administrative and financial burden upon 
the community. 
         Nor would granting a variance to Hovsons fundamentally 
undermine the Brick Township zoning scheme.  The Supreme Court 
has observed that, in broad general terms, the purpose of zoning 
law is "to prevent problems caused by the `pig in the parlor 
instead of the barnyard.'"  City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 
Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1781 (1995) (quoting 
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 
47 S. Ct. 114, 118 (1926)).  As the record makes clear, however, 
permitting the construction of a nursing home in the R-R-2 zone 
would cause no such problems.   
         We reject the Township of Brick's contention that 
nursing homes are fundamentally incompatible with the other 
permitted uses in the R-R-2 zone.  Brick Township appears to rely 
upon the blanket proposition that nursing homes are clearly out 
of place in residential zones.  This is precisely the type of 
land use planning that the FHAA was enacted to prevent and, if 
necessary, overrule.  Furthermore, the design construction of 
Holiday Village is similar to that of the local planned 
residential retirement communities, a permitted use in the R-R-2 
zone.  As both of these types of facilities cater to the elderly, 
Holiday Village could provide a useful resource to members of the 
local retirement communities who do not want to locate in a new 
area, but who are no longer able to care for themselves.     
         As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 
observed, "the handicapped may have little choice but to live in 
a commercial home if they desire to live in a residential 
neighborhood.  To provide the handicapped with equal housing 
opportunities, the City must make the necessary `reasonable 
accommodations.'"  Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 
Michigan, 13 F.3d 920, 930 (6th Cir. 1993).  We hold that under 
the facts in this case,  3604(f)(3)(B) requires that the 
Township of Brick permit Hovsons to proceed with its plans to 
build a nursing home in its R-R-2 zone.  This result is 
consistent with "the broad remedial intent of Congress embodied 
in the [Fair Housing] Act."  Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 
U.S. 363, 380, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1982).  See City of 
Edmonds, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1780 (noting the Fair 
Housing Act's "`broad and inclusive' compass, and therefore 
according a `generous construction' to the Act's complaint-filing 
provision") (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
409 U.S. 205, 209, 212, 93 S. Ct. 364, 367, 368 (1972));  see 
also Fair Housing Amendments Act, supra, at 763 ("The scope of 
the statute is sweeping, not only in the broad protections it 
affords, but also in the limited exceptions it allows.").   
         It is uncontroverted that the Township of Brick has a 
substantial interest in enforcing its zoning code and that, under 
appropriate circumstances, local zoning codes are entitled to a 
considerable amount of deference.  See, e.g., Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974);  
Doe v. City of Butler, Pennsylvania, 892 F.2d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 
1989).  We are also mindful of the fact that "[i]n requiring 
reasonable accommodation, . . . Congress surely did not mandate a 
blanket waiver of all facially neutral zoning policies and rules, 
regardless of the facts."  Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia 
Beach, Virginia, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1261 (E.D. Va. 1993).  Nor 
did Congress intend to "give handicapped persons carte blanche to 
determine where and how they would live regardless of zoning 
ordinances to contrary."  Thornton v. City of Allegan, 863 F. 
Supp. 504, 510 (W.D. Mich. 1993).  Nonetheless, the FHAA's 
promise that "reasonable accommodations" be provided to 
handicapped persons would be an empty one indeed if Brick 
Township were permitted to do nothing to accommodate the elderly 
disabled who are in need of nursing home care and desire to live 
in one of the Township's residential zones. 
         The House Report to the FHAA expressly states that the 
Act "is intended to prohibit . . . [the imposition of] terms or 
conditions . . . which have the effect of excluding . . . 
congregate living arrangements for persons with handicaps."  H.R. 
Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2184.  As one court has explained, "strict 
adherence to a rule which has the effect of precluding 
handicapped individuals from residing in the residence [of their 
choice] was precisely the type of conduct which the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act sought to overcome with the enactment of  
3604(f)(3)(B)."  United States v. Village of Marshall, Wisconsin, 
787 F. Supp. 872, 879 (W.D. Wis. 1991).   
 
                               IV. 
         We will reverse the August 16, 1995 order of the 
district court and remand this matter with instructions to enjoin 
the Township of Brick from interfering with the construction of 
the nursing home facility under the terms, conditions and 
specifications agreed to by the State of New Jersey.   
                             
 
 
 
